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Abstract 
The Complaint Model is an interpretation of Scanlon’s contractualism which holds that (1) an 
individual can reasonably reject a distribution of well-being when her complaint against that 
distribution is larger than any other person’s complaint against any other distribution. The 
Complaint Model further holds that (2) the size of an individual’s complaint against a distribution is 
a function of (2a) her absolute level of well-being under that distribution, with the size of her 
complaint increasing as her absolute level of well-being decreases, and (2b) the size of her loss in 
well-being under that distribution relative to the level of well-being she could have enjoyed under 
the distribution most favourable to her, with the size of her complaint increasing as her loss 
increases.  
 In this paper, I argue that the Complaint Model should be rejected, because the way in which it 
takes individuals’ losses into account leads to strongly counterintuitive results. In particular, I show 
that the Complaint Model may sacrifice the well-being associated with the least-well-off, second-
least-well-off, etc. positions for the sake of minimizing the largest complaint. I also argue that 
revisions to element (1) to allow for the aggregation of complaints must either leave the Complaint 
Model vulnerable to this objection or lead it to collapse into prioritarianism. 
 The failure of the Complaint Model may lead us to search for an alternative way of taking 
losses into account. I conclude by arguing that the attractiveness of the Anonymous Pareto 
principle poses a challenge to any such alternative. 
 
7,500 words (including abstract and endnotes). 
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Introduction 
 
Thomas Scanlon’s contractualism holds that “an act is wrong if [and only if] its 
performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for the 
general regulation of behaviour that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, 
unforced general agreement.”1 In order to determine which principles could not reasonably 
be rejected, Scanlon writes that contractualism would compare, in a way that blocks 
familiar and straightforward forms of aggregation, the “individual gains, losses, and levels 
of welfare” that would result from the acceptance of different feasible principles.2 The 
following procedure, which has become known as the Complaint Model, offers one way of 
making such comparisons.3 According to this model, (1) an individual can reasonably reject 
a distribution of well-being when her complaint against that distribution is larger than any 
other person’s complaint against any of the alternative distributions under consideration.4 
The size of a person’s complaint against a distribution is a function of (2a) her absolute 
level of well-being under that distribution, with the size of her complaint increasing as her 
absolute level of well-being decreases, and (2b) the size of her loss in well-being under that 
distribution relative to the level of well-being she would have enjoyed under the 
distribution most favourable to her, with the size of her complaint increasing as her loss 
increases.5 
 In this paper, I argue that the Complaint Model should be rejected, because the way in 
which it takes individuals’ losses into account leads to strongly counterintuitive results. My 
argument proceeds as follows. In section 1, I develop a simple version of the Complaint 
Model that offers a clear view of the impact of taking the size of an individual’s complaint 
to depend on her loss. In section 2, I argue, contra Bertil Tungodden, that this element of 
the Complaint Model does not lead to violations of the transitivity axiom of rational 
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choice.6 In section 3, I argue that the Complaint Model should instead be rejected because 
it asks us to sacrifice the well-being associated with the least-well-off, second-least-well-off, 
etc. positions for the sake of minimizing one individual’s complaint. I also argue that 
revisions to element (1) to allow for the aggregation of complaints must either leave the 
Complaint Model vulnerable to this objection or lead it to collapse into prioritarianism. 
These conclusions may lead us to search for an alternative way of taking losses into 
account. In section 4, I argue that the attractiveness of the Anonymous Pareto principle 
poses a challenge to any such alternative.  
 Throughout, I will make several simplifying assumptions. I shall only be concerned 
with pairwise choices between distributions involving the same, already existing individuals. 
I will also assume that no one has claims based on merit or desert; that no one is 
responsible for her level of well-being; and that no one has entitlements, or special claims. I 
will also exclude egalitarian concerns of the kind that are motivated by the thought that 
inequality is bad when and because it is unfair, with the presumption being that it is unfair 
that some are less well off than others due to no fault to choice of their own.7 Finally, I 
shall assume that each of the possible distributions under consideration constitutes a 
departure from the status quo. Hence we can ignore any moral privilege that might be 
conferred on a distribution by virtue of the fact that it constitutes the status quo. 
 
1. 
 
Scanlon produced the arguments from which the Complaint Model was developed in a bid 
to find a non-aggregative evaluative model that is not vulnerable to the following well-
known criticism of leximin.8 No matter what the level of well-being of the individuals in 
question is, leximin takes any potential improvement in the well-being of the occupant of 
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the better-off position, no matter how great, to be outweighed by any potential 
improvement in the well-being of the occupant of the worst-off position, no matter how 
small. As a result, leximin has strongly counterintuitive implications. To illustrate, imagine 
that a local council must decide how to spend a sum of money on improving the lives of 
two moderately well-off citizens. The council can either improve a local park (I) where Bob 
likes to walk his dog, or remove an old wall that is obscuring what would be a stunning 
ocean view from Ann’s house (II). Improving the park would have no impact on Ann’s 
quality of life, but would make a significant, but not a large contribution to Bob’s quality of 
life. Bob’s quality of life would be unaffected by the removal of the wall. Ann’s quality of 
life, on the other hand, would be greatly improved by its removal, since she would greatly 
enjoy the view from her home, and her house would rise in value. The resulting 
distributions of well-being are described in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Two distributions of well-being 
Distribution 
Individuals 
I II 
Ann 49 (moderately well off) 79 (very well off) 
Bob 52 (moderately well off) 48 (moderately well off)  
 
Ann is the worst off person under I, and Bob is the worst off person under II. Ann is 
much better off under II than under I. Bob is moderately well off under both I and II, and 
slightly better off under I than under II. One might then readily judge that leximin, which 
selects distribution I, would require Ann to forgo too large an improvement in welfare for 
the sake of a relatively small improvement in Bob’s welfare. 
 5 
 Of course, this criticism would be endorsed by a prioritarian or a utilitarian. But 
Scanlon did not want to endorse the response that these aggregative views offer to this 
objection to leximin. His solution involved widening the informational basis of evaluation 
to include gains and losses in the evaluation of the alternatives in this case (see Table 2). As 
we will see, by using this information, the Complaint Model can give the intuitively right 
answer in this case without recourse to aggregative reasoning.  
 
Table 2. The information that the Complaint Model uses in evaluating the 
distributions of  Table 1. 
Distribution 
Individuals 
I II 
Ann (2a) Is moderately well off 
(well-being level 49). 
 
(2b) Could be much better 
off (by 30 units). 
(2a) Is very well off (well-
being level 79). 
 
(2b) No other distribution 
under consideration makes 
Ann better off. 
Bob (2a) Is moderately well off 
(well-being level 52). 
 
(2b) No other distribution 
under consideration makes 
Bob better off. 
(2a) Is moderately well off 
(well-being level 48). 
 
(2b) Could be somewhat 
better off (by 4 units).  
 
The Complaint Model does so by considering what objection, or complaint, might be 
formulated on behalf of each individual against the choice of a particular distribution. To 
begin with, we can say that when the choice is between I and II only, Bob has no complaint 
against I being chosen, since no other arrangement under consideration would make him 
better off. For the same reason, Ann has no complaint against II. The largest complaint 
against principle I is therefore Ann’s, and the largest complaint against II is Bob’s. We 
should therefore compare the complaints in the two emphasised cells of Table 2, and 
choose I if Ann’s complaint against it is smaller than Bob’s complaint against II.  
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Since Bob’s situation would be pretty good under II, and since the possible 
improvement in his situation by switching to I would be small, his complaint against II is 
not large. Since Ann would stand to lose a great deal under I in comparison with II, and 
since her well-being under I is only somewhat greater than Bob’s well-being under II, Ann’s 
complaint against I appears to be larger than Bob’s complaint against II. It is therefore 
open to a proponent of the Complaint Model to select II.9 
This inclusion of individuals’ gains and losses in the evaluation of distributions seems 
to fit well with contractualist reasoning. For in reasoning about what would be the morally 
right thing to do in such cases, people typically make reference not just to how well or 
badly off the individuals involved would be under the various alternatives, but also to what 
is at stake for them in the choice between these alternatives, in terms of the benefits they 
would have to forgo if one or another of the alternatives was chosen. If asked to make a 
representation to the local council, we naturally imagine Ann saying: “I would greatly 
benefit from the removal of the wall, whereas Bob would gain only moderately from the 
improvements in the park. Moreover, Bob would still be pretty well off even without these 
improvements.” Leximin would not allow Ann to put her case in this way, since it does not 
allow this direct appeal to how much of a difference the choice of II, as opposed to I, 
would make to her and Bob. Instead, it allows arguments only in terms of how much 
difference the choice would make to the least-well-off person, which is an essentially 
anonymous label, in the sense that it does not necessarily track any named individual across 
different distributions. In sum, because it assigns moral importance to what it at stake for 
individuals, the Complaint Model has a claim to be trying to capture an element of moral 
reasoning that is overlooked by leximin. 
 To fill out our outline of the Complaint Model, we need to know how elements (2a) 
and (2b) interact to determine the magnitude an individual’s complaint. To my knowledge, 
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no one has yet offered a way of doing so. The reasoning behind the inclusion of element 
(2a), however, suggests the following straightforward way of doing so. The reason for 
including (2a) is that a given loss in well-being is more important when an individual’s level 
of well-being is lower, because providing someone with an extra unit of well-being is 
morally more important as his absolute level of well-being declines.10 This suggests that we 
should replace each individual’s level of well-being with the moral value of his level of well-
being, where the moral value of an individual’s well-being is a strictly increasing function of 
an individual’s level of well-being, with a negative second derivative. (This means that the 
marginal moral value of an extra unit of well-being is always positive, but diminishing.) We 
can then equate the size of an individual’s complaint against a distribution with the 
difference between the moral value of his well-being under that distribution and the moral 
value of his well-being under the distribution which is best for him. In other words, an 
individual’s complaint against a distribution equals the loss in the moral value of well-being 
he would suffer under that distribution. 
 By way of illustration, imagine that we are dealing with non-negative levels of well-
being only, and that the moral value of an individual’s well-being is the square root of her 
level of well-being. The moral value of each individual’s level of well-being under the 
distributions listed in Table 1 is then given in Table 3. Individuals’ complaints (the moral 
value of well-being that they have to give up under a particular distribution) are listed in 
Table 4. It follows that the Complaint Model selects distribution II. 
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Table 3. The moral value of well-being under the distributions of Table 1. 
Distribution 
Individuals 
I II 
Ann 7 8.9 
Bob 7.2 6.9 
 
Table 4. The complaints against the distributions of Table 1. 
Distribution 
Individuals 
I II 
Ann 1.9 0 
Bob 0 0.3 
 
 This straightforward way of determining individuals’ complaints fits the idea that an 
individual cannot complain if we choose the distribution under which she is as well off as 
possible (given the set of distributions under consideration). It also accords with the idea 
that, when an individual does have a complaint against a distribution, the size of her 
complaint increases as her well-being decreases. To illustrate this influence of an 
individual’s level of well-being on her complaint, consider the case described in Table 5. 
Ann’s well-being under III and IV corresponds to her well-being under I and II. Bob’s level 
of well-being is very low under both III and IV, and the difference between his well-being 
under III and IV equals the difference in his level of well-being under I and II (4 units). 
Given our assumption that the moral value of an individual’s well-being is equivalent to the 
square root of his level of well-being, this difference in Bob’s well-being was not enough to 
outweigh the substantive difference in well-being that these alternatives offered Ann in the 
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choice between I and II. However, in the choice between III and IV, this difference in well-
being acquires greater force because Bob is now so badly off. Indeed, as Table 6 and Table 
7 show, because of his low level of well-being, this difference in well-being now becomes 
sufficient to give Bob a complaint against IV that is greater than Ann’s complaint against 
III, so that the Complaint Model selects distribution III. 
 
Table 5. Two distributions of well-being. 
Distribution 
Individuals 
III IV 
Ann 49 (moderately well off) 79 (very well off) 
Bob 4 (very badly off) 0 (very badly off)  
  
Table 6. The moral value of well-being of the distributions of Table 5. 
Distribution 
Individuals 
III IV 
Ann 7 8.9 
Bob 2 0 
 
Table 7. The complaints against the distributions of Table 5. 
Distribution 
Individuals 
III IV 
Ann 1.9 0 
Bob 0 2 
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 This completes our development of a simple version of the Complaint Model for a 
choice between two distributions. I now turn to an evaluation of the model’s properties. 
 
2. 
 
Bertil Tungodden has argued that the Complaint Model violates transitivity, which is a 
central principle of rational choice.11 Transitivity holds that in a sequence of pairwise 
choices between alternatives, if the second alternative in the sequence is chosen over the 
first, and the third over the second, and so on, then the last alternative in the sequence 
should be chosen over the first. Examining the pairwise choices the Complaint Model 
would make between the distributions listed in Table 8 illustrates why it appears to violate 
this condition. 
 
Table 8. Three distributions of the moral value of well-being. 
Distributions 
Individuals 
V VI VII 
Ann 8 6 4.5 
Bob 4 6.5 7 
Charlize 4 5 7 
 
Consider first the choice between V and VI. The complaints for the pairwise choice 
between V and VI are given in Table 9. It follows that the Complaint Model chooses VI. 
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Table 9. The complaints for the pairwise choice between V and VI. 
Distribution 
Individuals 
V VI 
Ann 0 2 
Bob 2.5 0 
Charlize 1 0 
 
It is also straightforward to establish that in pairwise comparison, VII is chosen over 
VI.12 Transitivity therefore appears to demand that in pairwise comparison, VII is chosen 
over V. The Complaint Model instead chooses V over VII.13 Tungodden concludes that if 
we endorse transitivity, we should abandon the Complaint Model.  
 Before judging whether transitivity is indeed violated by this sequence of pairwise 
choices, we must first make sure that we have individuated alternatives by what John 
Broome calls “justifiers”: differences which are relevant grounds for our preferences over 
these alternatives.14 Now, the Complaint Model claims that the size of a person’s loss is a 
morally relevant characteristic of a distribution. It follows that when we individuate 
alternatives by what the Complaint Model claims are justifiers, the alternative “V-when-
compared-to-VI” needs to be distinguished from the alternative “V-when-compared-to-
VII”: though the distribution of well-being in both cases is of course the same, the 
distribution of losses is not, and this means we are not dealing with the same alternative. It 
follows that according to the Complaint Model, we are dealing with not three, but with six 
alternatives: “VII-when-compared-to-VI”, “VI-when-compared-to-VII”, “VI-when-
compared-to-V”, “V-when-compared-to-VI”, “VII-when-compared-to-V” and “V-when-
compared-to-VII”. From transitivity and the fact that the first of these alternatives is 
preferred to the second, and the third to the fourth, we are not entitled to conclude that the 
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fifth should be preferred to the sixth. It follows that transitivity is not violated by the 
sequence of pairwise choices generated by the Complaint Model. 
 Indeed, we can now see that the argument that the Complaint Model violates 
transitivity, and should therefore be abandoned, assumes what it sets out to establish. For 
the Complaint Model only violates transitivity if we assume that two identical distributions 
of well-being must have the same relevant properties, so that “V-when-compared-to-VI” is 
not relevantly different from to “V-when-compared-to-VII”. But this is to assume that 
losses are not morally relevant, and hence that the Complaint Model is mistaken. The 
Complaint Model cannot therefore be dismissed on the grounds that it violates transitivity. 
The foregoing does, however, help us realise that the Complaint Model has a 
pragmatically undesirable characteristic when we face a choice between three or more 
alternatives. Though, for simplicity, I have not proposed a way of determining individuals’ 
complaints in such cases, it is easy to see that the fact that such complaints will depend on 
the alternative distributions that are available will mean that whether one distribution is 
better than another will depend on the alternatives under consideration. To illustrate: 
suppose we choose a single distribution from the distributions listed in Table 8. Whichever 
we choose, we may instead prefer a different distribution if one of the unchosen 
distributions is eliminated from the feasible set. Suppose we choose VI when faced with 
the choice between all three. If we eliminate V from the set of alternatives under 
consideration, we now choose VII instead of VI. As we have seen, this change of 
preference between VI and VII is not irrational if we take losses to be relevant 
characteristics of alternatives. But the possibility of this pattern of choice does make the 
Complaint Model an inconvenient tool for decision-making in a choice between three or 
more alternatives. For if we employ it, we cannot always proceed by the pairwise appraisal 
and elimination of less good alternatives, or by several other methods that rely on 
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evaluating a sub-set of all feasible alternatives before moving on to consider a remaining 
smaller group of alternatives for final evaluation. We must instead form our judgement on 
the basis of the simultaneous comparison of all feasible alternatives.  
This fact alone does not disqualify the Complaint Model. If individuals’ losses are 
indeed of moral importance, we will simply have to accept this inconvenient consequence. 
I conclude that the Complaint Model cannot be rejected on the basis of its formal decision-
making properties. Instead, we should directly examine the plausibility of the Complaint 
Model’s choices. 
 
3. 
 
Suppose that due to a natural disaster, 900 inhabitants of a circular island, called One, Two, 
Three, …, Nine Hundred, have contracted a disease which steadily worsens each sufferer’s 
condition with death resulting after 1,000 days. The decline takes place in such a way that 
the moral value of preventing one day’s decline is equal throughout the progression of the 
disease. The affected individuals are all young adults who, before being affected, had 
excellent life prospects. A treatment exists which can permanently halt the progression of 
the disease; after treatment, an individual remains in the condition he was in on the day of 
treatment. This treatment must be brought to the affected individuals. The entire supply of 
the treatment is with us in the centre of the island, while the 900 affected individuals are 
spread out, equidistant from each other and in order from One to Nine Hundred, along the 
entire coast of the island. It takes one day to drive from one inhabitant to another. The 
island has a coastal road, which is passable in clockwise direction only. Only two roads, 
called Alpha and Omega, lead from the centre to the coastal road. On Alpha, which leads 
to the individual called One, it takes one day to reach the coast. On Omega, which leads to 
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the individual called Nine Hundred, it takes two days to reach the coast. If we take road 
Alpha, One gets treated on day 1, Two gets treated on day 2, Three gets treated on day 3, 
etc., and Nine Hundred gets treated on day 900. If we take road Omega, Nine Hundred 
gets treated on day 2, One gets treated on day 3, etc., and Eight Hundred Ninety-Nine gets 
treated on day 901. A total waiting time of 1 day means the individual suffers only a small 
decline in health, and can still lead an excellent life. A total waiting time of 901 days means 
an individual will be reduced to a state just somewhat better than death. This situation is 
represented in Figure 1. The resulting distributions of waiting times are depicted in Table 
10. (Given our assumptions, these translate straightforwardly into distributions of well-
being, with a waiting time of 1 day equivalent to the moral value of excellent life prospects, 
a waiting time of 901 days equivalent to the moral value of the well-being attained by 
someone with a life just somewhat better than death at a young age, and the moral value of 
the well-being of persons who wait for a time in between these extremes declining linearly 
in waiting time.) 
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Figure 1. The Island Disease Case 
 
 
Table 10. Two distributions of waiting times in days. 
Distributions 
Individuals 
Alpha Omega 
One 1 3 
Two 2 4 
Three 3 5 
… … … 
Eight Hundred Ninety-Nine 899 901 
Nine Hundred 900  2 
  
 Which road should we take? The Complaint Model will favour Omega over Alpha, 
because Nine Hundred’s complaint against Alpha is greater than anyone else’s complaint 
against Omega. Since the levels of well-being associated with the least-well-off, second-
Alpha Omega 
 One 
  Two 
Nine Hundred 
 Four Hundred and Fifty 
Direction of 
movement on 
the coastal 
road. 
Initial location 
of treatment 
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least-well-off, etc. positions are all lower under Omega than under Alpha, the Complaint 
Model therefore asks us to sacrifice the well-being associated with every position for the 
sake of lessening one individual’s loss.  
 I take it that, in so doing, the Complaint Model goes against our intuitive judgement. 
For even if one regards as significant the fact that Nine Hundred would be a great deal 
better off under Omega than under Alpha, and that this improvement in his situation 
would be purchased at a relatively small loss in everyone else’s well-being, the force of 
these reasons in favour of Omega is intuitively outweighed by the following reasons in 
favour of Alpha: Though Nine Hundred would be badly off under Alpha, if we took road 
Omega, another person would simply end up in an even worse situation than Nine 
Hundred would be in under Alpha. Moreover, under Omega, Nine Hundred’s move into 
the best-off position would come at a cost to the well-being of the occupant of that 
position and well-being of the occupant of every other position. 
 Given this counterintuitive result, I believe the Complaint Model should be rejected. 
The question then naturally arises whether the Complaint Model can be revised to avoid 
this result. One revision that is of particular interest is proposed by David Brink.15 Brink 
notes that the Complaint Model leads to counterintuitive conclusions in cases of a different 
kind, in which we can save either one person from very serious harm, or a great many 
people from slightly less serious harm, and we cannot save both the one and the many 
from harm. In such cases, the Complaint Model would require us to save the one from 
very serious harm, since the one’s complaint against the decision to save the many is larger 
than any other person’s complaint against the decision to save the one. Brink regards this 
result as unacceptable, and proposes replacing the aim of minimizing the largest complaint 
with the following rule: a single complaint should be outweighed by a sufficiently large 
number of smaller complaints that are “close enough” to it in magnitude, but should not 
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be outweighed by any number of smaller complaints that are not close enough to it in 
magnitude.16 Call this the “Aggregate-Complaints-When-Close-Enough” Model. 
 It is easy to see that the case described in Table 10 also defeats this model: Nine 
Hundred’s complaint against Alpha is almost four hundred and fifty times as large as 
anyone else’s complaint against Omega. It is therefore plausible to assume that, in Brink’s 
view, the difference in the size of individuals’ complaints would be too large to allow for 
the smaller complaints to counterbalance the single largest complaint. The “Aggregate-
Complaints-When-Close-Enough” Model will therefore reach the same conclusion as the 
Complaint Model: it will tell us to choose Omega when, intuitively, we should choose 
Alpha. 
 What would happen if we replaced Brink’s aggregative rule by a more familiar form of 
aggregation, and simply aimed at minimizing the sum of complaints? It is easy to confirm 
that in the case described in Table 10, we would then arrive at the intuitively correct 
conclusion. However, we would also no longer have a distinctive evaluative model: for the 
aim of minimizing the sum of complaints—i.e., the sum of losses in the moral value of 
well-being—is just a different way of expressing the aim of maximizing the sum-total of 
moral value. Including information on losses in our decision-making would therefore be an 
unnecessary exercise: we would simply return by a roundabout route to the prioritarianism 
to which the Complaint Model was meant to provide an alternative. 
 
4. 
 
In sum, the way in which the Complaint Model and the “Aggregate-Complaints-When-
Close-Enough” Model take account of losses violates considered case judgements, while 
the straightforward summing of losses leads us back to prioritarianism. These conclusions 
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may lead us to attempt a different way of sometimes giving comparatively larger losses 
disproportional weight. Such an account might also give independent weight to aim of 
improving the well-being attached to each position, thereby attempting to avoid the 
objection raised in the previous section. 
 The following Symmetrical Island Disease Case forms a test case for such an account.17 
Suppose that it is possible to reach Nine Hundred by a straight road Psi, on which it takes 
just as long to reach Nine Hundred as it does to reach One by road Alpha. This situation is 
depicted in Figure 2; the concomitant distributions of waiting time are represented in Table 
11. 
 
Figure 2. The Symmetrical Island Disease Case 
 
 
Alpha Psi 
 One 
  Two 
Nine Hundred 
 Four Hundred and Fifty 
Direction of 
movement on 
the coastal 
road. 
Initial location 
of treatment 
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Table 11. Two distributions of waiting time in days. 
Distributions 
Individuals 
Alpha Psi 
One 1 2 
Two 2 3 
Three 3 4 
… … … 
Eight Hundred Ninety-Nine 899 900 
Nine Hundred 900  1 
 
 The following facts about this case appear relevant. First, Nine Hundred’s loss under 
Alpha would be far greater than anyone else’s loss under Psi. Second, the sum of the 
smaller losses that everyone except Nine Hundred would incur under Psi is equal to Nine 
Hundred’s loss under Alpha. Third, from the perspective of the well-being attached to 
various positions, Alpha is just as good as Psi. Any account that gives comparatively large 
losses disproportional weight would therefore have to conclude that only Psi is permissible. 
By contrast, accounts that hold that the sum of smaller losses balance a larger loss when 
the two are equally large, or that hold that only the well-being attached to various positions 
matters, would have to be indifferent between Alpha and Psi. 
 Which of these perspectives on this case is correct? The following might be said from 
Nine Hundred’s perspective in favour of judging that only Psi is permissible in this case.18 
“If you choose Alpha, you will consign me to suffering and debilitation for the rest of my 
life from which you could almost completely spare me by choosing Psi instead, under 
which I would be in almost perfect health. The cost to others of choosing Psi over Alpha 
is, in each case, a far smaller loss of one rather than 900 day’s worth of decline in health. 
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Moreover, this loss to others does not even outweigh my loss in the aggregate. Surely, 
when everything else is equal, the great loss you could spare me provides decisive reason to 
choose Psi over Alpha.” 
 On the other hand, we might defend indifference between Alpha and Psi as follows 
against Nine Hundred’s argument. “This case presents us with two ways of organising a 
queue for aid to which each person has an equal claim and without which everyone would 
die. Since the queues are not yet formed, no one has a claim to any particular place in the 
queue on the basis of the status quo. Furthermore, it purely a matter of brute luck which 
places people could occupy in the queue. The fact that you could only either occupy a place 
at the front of the queue or at the end, whilst everyone else could only be placed in one of 
two adjacent positions therefore does not give you a claim to be placed at the front of the 
queue. Instead, we should assess the options open to us from the perspective of how much 
good we can do for each position in the queue. Assessed in this way, the two alternatives 
open to us are equally good. The badness of your situation if we chose Alpha and placed 
you at the back of the queue is equivalent to the badness of the situation of Eight Hundred 
Ninety-Nine if we chose Psi and placed him at the back; the goodness of your situation if 
we chose Psi and placed you at the front of the queue is equivalent to the goodness of the 
situation of One if we chose Alpha and placed him at the front. The same equivalence 
between Alpha and Psi holds for every other position in the queue. We should therefore be 
indifferent between Alpha and Psi.” 
 When we consider this case in isolation, it is not an easy matter to decide which of 
these arguments is most persuasive: the considered judgements of those I have discussed it 
with divide roughly along the lines outlined, and my own views are uncertain. I believe, 
however, that the argument in favour of indifference between Alpha and Psi is 
strengthened by consideration of the following case.19 Suppose that, alone among all 
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infected individuals, One has a version of the disease that progresses twice as fast after the 
first day. We must choose between road Alpha and road Chi, on which it takes one day to 
reach Nine Hundred. The distribution of “waiting time equivalents” under Chi is therefore 
identical to Psi except in the case of One, whose condition at the time of treatment on day 
2 would be equivalent to anyone else’s condition after waiting 3 days. 
 Nine Hundred could argue as follows in favour of Chi.20 “If you choose Alpha, you will 
consign me to suffering and debilitation for the rest of my life from which you could 
almost completely spare me by choosing Chi instead, under which I would be in almost 
perfect health. The cost to others of choosing Chi over Alpha is one or two day’s worth of 
decline, which is a far smaller loss than 900 day’s worth of decline in health. Moreover, this 
loss to others just barely outweighs my loss in the aggregate. Surely, this bare outweighing 
is not enough to cancel out the moral force of the great loss you could spare me by 
choosing Chi over Alpha.” 
 In this case, it strikes me that this reasoning leads to the wrong conclusion. No one, I 
believe, has a claim to be moved to the front of the queue for medical attention when this 
would not improve any position in the queue and would worsen the situation at some point 
in the queue. Moreover, the reasoning used above in favour of indifference between Alpha 
and Psi seems to me to offer the best explanation for this judgement. Since both the 
misfortune of contracting the disease and the possible queue positions are matters of brute 
luck, no one has a claim to occupy any particular position in the queue. We should 
therefore assess the options open to us from the perspective of how much good we can do 
for each position in the queue. Assessed in this way, Alpha is better than Chi, since the 
second position in the queue is better under Alpha than under Chi, and no position is 
worse.  
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 This reasoning supports the idea that the aim of preventing a comparatively large loss 
should not be pursued when doing so would violate a principle known as Anonymous 
Pareto. This principle states that a first distribution is better than a second when the levels 
of well-being attained by individuals in the first distribution can be re-assigned among them 
to yield a distribution that is Pareto-superior to the second, in the sense that no one in the 
permuted first distribution would be worse off than in the second, and at least one 
individual would be better off. (In this case, since a permutation of Alpha is Pareto-
superior to Chi, Anonymous Pareto requires that we choose Alpha rather than Chi.) 
Anonymous Pareto gives general expression to the idea that when individuals’ possible 
levels of well-being are due to arbitrary factors, we should direct our attention to the well-
being attained by the least-well-off, second-least-well-off, etc. positions, and should favour 
a first distribution over a second distribution when the first is better for at least one 
position and worse for no position.21  
 Now, I believe that someone who would defend the choice of Psi over Alpha in our 
previous example would face the following dilemma. The first possibility is to choose Chi 
over Alpha. As explained, this strikes me as counterintuitive. The second possibility is to 
opt for Alpha in this choice between Alpha and Chi. Someone who took this view would 
then have to explain why the aim of preventing larger losses is not decisive when 
Anonymous Pareto speaks in favour of one distribution, but can still be decisive in other 
cases. Put differently: if the aim of minimizing comparatively large losses is of moral 
importance, why should it always be lexically inferior to the aim of improving the well-
being attained by each position? At present, I cannot see a satisfactory answer to this 
question. The most attractive way to avoid this dilemma seems to be to accept indifference 
between Alpha and Psi and to favour Alpha over Chi. But this would rule out an account in 
which comparatively large losses can carry disproportionate weight. 
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Conclusion 
 
In a choice between distributions, the case for paying attention to losses in addition to the 
well-being attached to various positions rests on the following ideas: what is at stake for 
individuals is of moral importance, and smaller losses can not straightforwardly be summed 
to balance a single larger loss. Though these ideas have seemed appealing to some, I have 
argued that two models of decision-making that are based on them fail to yield plausible 
conclusions. I have also argued that it is not easy to see how one might incorporate them 
into any plausible model of decision-making. This may be simply taken as a challenge; it 
may also prompt us to reject these ideas about the distinctive importance of comparatively 
large losses. Rejecting them would have the following consequence for Scanlon’s 
contractualism. Whether an individual could reasonably reject a distribution would depend 
only on the well-being attached to the least-well-off, second-least-well-off, etc., position 
under that distribution and its alternatives; individual losses would not count.22 
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following purported counterexample to Anonymous Pareto. Ann, Bob, and Charlize are involved in a 
shipwreck. Charlize is an excellent swimmer, and would make it to shore alone, though the swim would give 
her a nasty cold. Ann and Bob will die without our help, however. Unfortunately, they have drifted away 
from each other, and we can only save one of them before the other drowns. If we save Bob, we can 
costlessly pick up Charlize, who will thereby be spared her cold. If we save Ann, Charlize must make it to 
shore alone. These two possibilities are outlined in the following table. 
Distributions 
Individuals 
Save Ann  Save Bob  
Ann Lives Dies 
Bob Dies Lives 
Charlize Catches a cold In good health. 
 
 Since the worst outcome is the same in both cases, while the second-worst outcome is better if we save 
Bob’s life and Charlize from catching cold, Anonymous Pareto requires that we do the latter. Kamm argues, 
however, that this type of reasoning would fail to recognize the fact that Bob and Ann’s lives are at stake in 
this decision; by comparison to their potential loss, Charlize’s cold is insignificant. Rather than letting 
Charlize’s loss tip the balance, she argues, we should toss a fair coin to decide between saving Bob’s life and 
Charlize from a cold or saving Ann’s life. Tossing a fair coin is the right way to recognise that Ann and Bob 
have an equal claim to the indivisible resource of our aid, both because it eliminates partiality and bias in our 
decision-making and because it ensures the fair distribution of something of value: a 50 percent chance at 
being saved. (See also Michael Otsuka, “The Fairness of Equal Chances” [unpublished] for a review and 
defence of these reasons for tossing a coin in this case.) It follows, Kamm concludes, that we go wrong in 
this case if we do not take account of what is at stake for individuals. 
 On closer inspection, however, this case is not a counterexample to Anonymous Pareto. Consider the 
two reasons we have for tossing a fair coin in order to decide between saving Ann and saving Bob (and 
sparing Charlize a cold). We can here set aside impartiality, since Anonymous Pareto is also impartial. Now 
turn to the second reason: that since is it not possible to satisfy both Ann’s and Bob’s equal claims on our aid, 
the best we can do is give them each something else of value, viz. an equal chance at survival. Now, if an 
equal chance is of value, then the previous table does not really contain all the relevant distributions of 
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benefits. Instead, the choice is between the three distributions listed below. But then it is no longer the case 
that Anonymous Pareto recommends saving Bob rather than tossing a fair coin, since given our assumption 
that a chance is a benefit, tossing a fair coin has higher benefits associated with the least-well-off position 
than saving Bob. On the other hand, if an equal chance is not a benefit, then I believe that the only 
permissible option is to save Bob’s life and save Charlize from a cold, so that the case again does not 
represent a counterexample to Anonymous Pareto. 
Distributions 
Individuals 
Save Ann Save Bob 
 
Toss a fair coin 
Heads                     Tails 
Ann Lives Dies Lives Dies 
Bob Dies Lives Dies Lives 
Charlize Catches a cold  In good health  Catches a cold In good health 
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